Advancing Understanding of Knowledge\u27s Role in Lay Risk Perception by Johnson, Branden B.
RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 4
Number 3 RISK: Issues in Health & Safety Article 3
June 1993
Advancing Understanding of Knowledge's Role in
Lay Risk Perception
Branden B. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, and the
Environmental Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Branden B. Johnson, Advancing Understanding of Knowledge's Role in Lay Risk Perception, 4 RISK 189 (1993).
Advancing Understanding




In the last two decades, scholars, agencies and firms have become
increasingly interested in why laypeople see something as a threat.
Curiosity, worry over scientific illiteracy, and social conflicts over
potential threats foster the field of risk perception, a misleading but
standard term. Many hope research on lay perception will help resolve
conflicts, a hope that colors the focus and findings of many studies.
Knowledge about hazards plays a central but curious role in risk
perception research. Knowledge is and should be important in risk
perception; if not, humans would have died out long ago. Most people
doing or funding this research know more about specific hazards than
the average citizen. Yet their expertise blinds them to the complexity of
hazard knowledge, and they take the importance of their own
knowledge for granted. For example, most studies have probed only
how knowledge affects lay risk perceptions, ignoring similar questions
- about experts and often dismissing lay concerns. Such pride and over-
simplification have meant missing important aspects of hazard
knowledge.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological
Association meeting in Pittsburgh, Aug. 1992. That version was made available
through the Sociological Abstracts Delivery Service (for an abstract, see SA accession
number 92S26088). This version benefited from comments by an anonymous
reviewer. The views in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and
Energy (NJ DEPE).
** Dr. Johnson is a Research Scientist in the Risk Communication Unit NJ DEPE
Division of Science and Research (DSR). He holds a B.A. (Environmental Values and
Behavior) from University of Hawaii, a M.A. (Environmental Affairs) and a Ph.D.
(Geography) from Clark University.
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This paper emphasizes how knowledge affects lay risk perception,
citing the role of experts' knowledge in their risk perceptions only
when needed to point up the narrowness of some current views on lay
knowledge. The paper summarizes studies of knowledge in lay risk
perception that have used three different foci (facts, cognitive heuristics
or rules of thumb, and mental models). It then outlines some challenges
of defining knowledge, beginning with the current treatment of
knowledge and ignorance as endpoints on a single dimension, ignoring
multiple dimensions of both. The utility of focusing on facts rather than
conceptual structures is doubtful, and the usual distinction between
direct (experience) and indirect knowledge is inadequate. The last
definitional problem discussed is the way in which the term risk
"perception" confuses quite different aspects of response to hazards.
The next section reviews how further research on three aspects of
knowledge use can advance understanding of its role in lay risk
perception. The first aspect discussed is knowledge production, with
assessments of the effect of differing producers and aims, and alleged
differences between the discovery and justification of knowledge. The
second aspect discussed is knowledge dissemination, with a comparison
of the huge (but often misleading) literature on the effects of mass media
to the relative neglect of the role of social networks. The last aspect of
knowledge use reviewed is that of information processing, concerning
heuristics, risk aversion, after-the-fact justifying of behavior, and the
serious efforts many laypeople make to understand science for their own
ends. The paper ends by suggesting that improvements in studying lay
knowledge can illuminate experts' hazard knowledge as well.
Studies of Knowledge in Risk Perception
Research on knowledge and lay risk perception falls into two major
categories and a third, smaller class: (1) evaluating public grasp of facts
about nature and technology for their effect on attitudes toward hazard;
(2) identifying heuristics with which people process information on
hazards; and (3) describing laypeople's conceptual frameworks for
hazards.
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The factual approach has been most common, although the
heuristics results are better known. Most factual studies focused on
radiation, trying to relate knowledge to public support or opposition to
facilities (nuclear power, nuclear waste) or to individual behavior (radon
testing and mitigation). These studies defined knowledge as "correct"
answers to factual questions, such as "What is the name of the process
that generates energy in nuclear power plants?" and "What is the fuel
used in nuclear fission plants?" About half of these studies found that
people who know more such facts support nuclear power; the other
studies found no difference in knowledge among pro- and anti-nuclear
laypeople, or that anti-nuclear people know more. 1 A few other studies,
using similar factual measures, concerned irradiated food,2 ground-
water pollution,3 hazardous waste cleanup,4 air pollution,5 hazardous
waste, surface water pollution, automobile collisions, 6 natural radon, 7
and earthquakes. 8 Some found more knowledge linked to lower concern
1 See, e.g., BARBARA D. MELBERET AL., NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC:
ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED SURVEY RESEARCH (Battelle Human Affairs Research
Center, 1977); James H. Kuklinski, Daniel S. Metlay & W.D. Kay, Citizen
Knowledge and Choices on the Complex Issue of Nuclear Energy, 26 AM. J. POL
SCI. 615 (1982); Jennifer Brown, Terence Lee & Joyce Henderson, Public Perception
of Nuclear Power (British Psychological Society, London, Dec. 1983); STANLEY M.
NEALEY, BARBARA D. MELBER & WILLIAM L. RANKIN, PUBLIC OPINION AND
NUCLEAR ENERGY (1983); and JOHN M. WILKES & JOHN H. REED, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE AND INTERPRETATION OF NUCLEAR POWER BEFORE AND AFTER TMI
(unpublished, Worcester Polytechnic Institute 1985).
2 Richard J. Bord & Robert E. O'Connor, Risk Communication, Knowledge, and
Attitudes: Explaining Reactions to a Technology Perceived as Risky, 10 RISK ANAL.
499 (1990).
3 BONNEY F. HUGHES, KNOWLEDGE, BELIEFS AND ACTIONS OF ELMIRA WATER
CUSTOMERS RELATED TO GROUNDWATER, CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER, AND
TOXICOLOGY (M.S. thesis, Cornell University 1986).
4 Richard J. Bord & Robert E. O'Connor, Determinants of Risk Perceptions of a
Hazardous Waste Site, 12 RISK ANAL. 411 (1992).
5 Brian R.N. Baird, Tolerancefor Environmental Health Risks: The Influence of
Knowledge, Benefits, Voluntariness, and Environmental Attitudes, 6 RISK ANAL.
425 (1986).
6 Branden B. Johnson & Bradley Baltensperger, Community Risk Perception: A
Pilot Study, in RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 337 (Lester Lave ed. 1987).
7 Dominic Golding, Sheldon Krimsky & Alonzo Plough, Evaluating Risk
Communication: Narrative vs. Technical Presentations of Information About Radon,
12 RISK ANAL. 27 (1992).
8 ALAN J. WYNER & DEAN E. MANN, SEISMIC SAFETY POLICY IN CALIFORNIA:
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about risks (e.g., from hazardous waste cleanup) and more support for
a technology's use (e.g., opposing a ban on irradiated food). Others
found such relationships weak (e.g., irradiated food, air pollution) or
negative (e.g., automobile collisions, earthquakes, natural radon). For
example, those with more facts were more likely to demand protection
against polluted groundwater. In short, the link between factual
technical knowledge and perceived risk is at best variable.
A second research emphasis has been heuristics that people use to
process information. One heuristic is availability, judging an event as
more likely if it is easier to recall or imagine. For example, laypeople
inexperienced with probabilities seem to overestimate the frequency of
low-probability but dramatic hazards (e.g., nuclear power plant
accidents), as compared to expert risk estimates. They also under-
estimate high-probability hazards that are less memorable, like some
diseases. 9 People's risk perceptions also seem strongly affected by how
a problem is framed or presented. For example, their estimates of death
rates varied by whether they were asked for deaths or survivals, rates or
frequencies. 10 These findings have been widely taken to mean that lay
heuristics and statistical illiteracy bias lay risk estimates, and thus
evaluations of danger, away from those of experts. Such views ignore
warnings by heuristics researchers and others that these problems also
affect hazard experts, making comparisons of "accurate" expert and
"distorted" lay views misleading. 11
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND EARTHQUAKES (Report to the National Science
Foundation) (1983).
9 Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. ExP. PSYCH.:
HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551 (1978). These results were replicated by Engineering
and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University Graduate Research Methods Class, On
Judging the Frequency ofLethal Events: A Replication, 3 RISK ANAL. I1 (1983).
10 BARUCH FISCHHOFF & DONALD MACGREGOR, JUDGED LETHALITY (Decision
Research, Inc. 1980).
II M. HYNES & ERIC VANMARCKE, RELIABILITY OF EMBANKMENT PERFORMANCE
PREDICTION (Proceedings of the ASCE Engineering Mechanics Division Specialty
Conference) (1976); Jonathan Borak & Suzanne Veilleux, Errors of Intuitive Logic
Among Physicians, 16 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1939 (1982); William R. Freudenburg,
Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the Art of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment, 242 SCIENCE 42 (1988); Brian Wynne, Sheepfarming After Chernobyl:
A Case Study in Communicating Scientific Information, 31 ENV. 10-15, 33-40
(1989); Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Scientific Method, Anti-Foundationalism and
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The latest category of knowledge studies tries to describe the
conceptual structure of lay hazards knowledge. One study revealed this
structure implicitly through surveys revealing that laypeople and experts
disagree strongly on many points of toxicology. For example, many
laypeople do not conceive of exposure as mediating between chemical
releases and health effects. Yet, both experts and laypeople disagreed
among themselves about how animal tests apply to humans. 12 A more
explicit approach to conceptual structure comes under the rubric of
"mental models." A group of U.S. researchers began by assessing
experts' conceptual structure for the events leading to a given hazardous
outcome (e.g., cancer from natural radon, deaths due to nuclear energy
sources in space, damage from floods). 13 They then identified concepts
members of the public hold on the topic, through open-ended interviews
and surveys, and compared them with the experts' conceptual structure.
German researchers have used a somewhat different approach to study
mental models of pharmaceutical drugs. 14 No one has yet explicitly
tested how mental models might affect perceived risk.
Use of expert knowledge as the baseline has yielded ambiguous
results on knowledge's effect on lay risk perception. To assess the
importance of knowledge in citizens' views of hazard given
contradictory evidence, we must examine the flaws of past studies,
rather than simply continue to replicate them.
Public Decisionmaking, 1 RISK 23 (1990).
12 Nancy Kraus, Torbjom Malmfors & Paul Slovic, Intuitive Toxicology: Expert
and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks, 12 RISK ANAL. 215 (1992).
13 Tamara R. Lave & Lester B. Lave, Public Perception of the Risks of Floods:
Implications for Communication, 11 RISK ANAL. 255 (1991); Michael Maharik &
Baruch Fischhoff, The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay
Activists' Perceptions, 12 RISK ANAL. 383 (1992); Ann Bostrom, Baruch Fischhoff
& M. Granger Morgan, Characterizing Mental Models of Hazardous Processes: A
Methodology and an Application to Radon, J. Soc. IssuEs, in press.
14 Helmut Jungermann, Holger Schutz & Manfred Thuring, Mental Models in Risk
Assessment. Informing People about Drugs, 8 RISK ANAL. 147 (1988). For a
methodological discussion, see William B. Rouse & Nancy M. Morris, On Looking
into the Black Box: Prospects and Limits in the Search for Mental Models, 100
PSYCH. BuLL. 349 (1986).
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Defining Knowledge
Scientific advances depend upon properly defining the issue of
study; scholars can dispute whether given definitions support or stifle
progress, but limits must be set. Unfortunately, research on knowledge
and risk perception has used poor taxonomies and definitions that
wrongly seem self-evident. These concern the relations of knowledge
and ignorance, facts and conceptual structures, direct and indirect
knowledge, and distinct aspects of what is known as "risk perception."
Knowledge versus Ignorance
Almost all of this research assumes that knowledge has one
dimension, with people having more or less of it. This view depends
upon critical assumptions, i.e. that experts know all that is important
about hazards, and social conflict stems solely or primarily from lay
ignorance. In this view one can ignore citizens' views on policy: Either
they do not know whereof they speak or they will simply agree with
experts' prior conclusions. Advocates of this view infer two answers to
conflict. For hazards outside lay individuals' control, the preferred
method is put trust in, and delegation of hazard management to, experts.
A second method is to educate citizens, assuming this would shift public
attitudes toward those of experts. William Ruckelshaus, former
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, supported this
approach, if uneasily: 15
In confused situations one must try to be guided by basic
principles. One of my basic principles is reflected in a
quotation from Thomas Jefferson: "If we think [the people]
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion." Easy for him to say.
Taking knowledge and ignorance as ends of a continuum is,
however, a caricature even of specific scientific fields. There are many
types of ignorance, and therefore of knowledge. The taxonomy in
Figure 1 points out that probability - the focus of both quantitative risk
assessment and much concern about lay technical illiteracy - is only
one branch of ignorance. 16
15 William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 4 RISK ANAL. 157, 160 (1984).
16 MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY: EMERGING PARADIGMS
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The hazards field's unduly narrow emphasis on probability may
explain why researchers have scorned the idea that cultural taboos shape
risk perception at least as much as uncertainty. What one should not
think about may be more vital than how well one knows what one does
think about. 17 One cannot assume that effective hazard response
depends only upon knowing probabilities, nor that other kinds of
knowledge offset a deficit in statistical skills. Yet, the one-dimensional
view ignores the likelihood of multiple knowledges and ignorances.
An odd result of this blindness is that much risk perception research,
particularly the "factual" variety, seems to banish even uncertainty.
(1989). [Figure 1 is adapted from Smithson, at 9.] See also SILviO 0. FUNTOWICZ &
JEROME R. RAVETZ, UNCERTAINTY AND QUALITY IN S CIENCE FOR POLICY (1990).
17 MARYDOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OFTECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982).
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Scholars tend to assume no variations in the data available to citizens,
the character of inferences one can reasonably draw from the data, or the
confidence one has in those inferences. The rich, subtle world of the
practicing scientist or engineer becomes black-and-white when they
review the alleged ignorance of lay risk perception. Ironically, hazards
for which lay ignorance seems to upset experts most (e.g., nuclear
power, chemical wastes, recombinant DNA) are often those for which
expert knowledge is most uncertain. 18 In some cases experts may know
little more than laypeople for the foreseeable future (e.g., in
epidemiological studies of cancer clusters). 19
Knowledge and ignorance exist for both laypeople and experts.
Researchers' failure to consider multiple dimensions of knowledge and
ignorance undermines one's confidence in the validity of their findings
on lay knowledge and risk perception.
Facts versus Conceptual Structure
The factual studies cited earlier correlated correct answers to positive
attitudes toward a technology, e.g., implying that facts learned change
attitudes.20 Researchers did not justify this approach, apparently taking
it as obvious. Are isolated "facts" necessary, much less sufficient, for
thought or discourse on a subject? Creationist arguments stem partly
from assuming that the theory of evolution is merely a pile of facts. If
one such fact is false, they believe the theory must collapse, a view at
odds with scientific practice. 2 1 Fact-focused research on knowledge and
hazards unwittingly bolsters the creationist argument.
Facts are also less definitive than often assumed. People who jointly
see something should never be wholly confident that the group observed
18 Freudenburg, supra note 11.
19 Contrast Raymond Neutra, Shanna Swan & Thomas Mack, Clusters Galore:
hIsights About Environmental Clusters from Probability Theory, 127 Sci. OFTHE
TOTAL ENV. 187 (1992); and Daniel Wartenberg & Michael Greenberg,
Methodological Problems in Investigating Disease Clusters, 127 Set. OF THE TOTAL
ENv. 173 (1992).
20 Another hypothesis is that education expands cognitive capacity, allowing one to
draw new conclusions from the same data and change one's attitude. However, this
hypothesis cannot be tested with these studies' designs.
21 James B. Miller & Dean R. Fowler, What's Wrong with the Creation/Evolution
Controversy? AAAS, May 1984.
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reality. Simultaneous delusion, implicit or explicit social pressure to
conform, and cognitive biases that are general (heuristic) or situational
(e.g., how good is the evidence that this person died in an automobile
collision?) may affect the observation. The problem is even more acute
when hazards stem from events so rare or hypothetical that experts must
create facts from their judgments to have any evidence. Facts become
"strongly held beliefs shared by expert groups" 22 If strongly held risk
beliefs that experts label as facts become bound to other expert beliefs
about the benefit of a hazardous technology, for example, why should
these expert beliefs become facts required for lay support for the same
technology? Laypeople's experience can also make them skeptical of
expert facts, as with farmers' experience of varied microenvironments
and patients' experience of variability in their own or others'
metabolisms.23 Treating these reactions as wrong misconstrues the
contingent place of facts in knowledge.
A rebuttal to this argument for contingent facts is that social context
affects knowledge only during its discovery, as Newton's mysticism
affected his choice of topics and methods. In contrast, getting others to
validate one's discovery forces the use of objective evidence that will
appeal to experts with other views.24 However, this rebuttal is only
partly true, assuming as it does that the only producers of hazard
knowledge are scientists who wish to justify their data and
interpretations to colleagues. But producers are not always scientists;
they may not produce easily verifiable information; and their audiences
(e.g., potential funders of scientific research) may not understand or
find salient scientific defenses of data.
Also, the history and sociology of science (and, to a lesser degree,
of technology) show social context also shapes justification, and thus
22 Harry J. Otway & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Beyond Acceptable Risk: On the
Social Acceptability of Technologies, 14 PoL'Y SCI. 247 (1982); Freudenburg, supra
note 11.
23 Brian Wynne, Knowledges in Context, 16 ScI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 111, 115
(1991).
24 Joseph Ben-David, Academic Market, Ideology, and the Growth of Scientific
Knowledge: Physiology in Mid-Nineteenth Century Germany, in SIEGWART
LINDENBERG, JAMES S. COLEMAN & STEFAN NOWAK, APPROACHES TO SOCIAL
THEORY 63 (1986).
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knowledge.25 Only the degree of social construction of the contexts of
discovery and justification is in dispute. Scholars agree that scientific
discourse and practice validate facts more than'by simply displaying
them to a jury of the discoverer's peers. Kuhn's idea of scientific
paradigms,26 although limited, ended the scholarly assumption that "the
facts" decide scientific conflicts. Attempts to classify fields by the
"hardness" of their knowledge - the chance that a hypothesis or theory
will endure - are dubious. One must "ask for whom, in what
circumstances, on what occasions, how, and why does this [field]
appear hard.... -27 Similarly, scholars increasingly see a technology's
attributes as a temporary, shifting outcome of complex social negotiation
over what the technology is.28 Unfortunately, even most scholars who
view technology as a social construct apply this perspective only to
items that evoke political conflict.29 For both science and technology, at
best consensus implies that the group is closer to reality than if its
members did not agree, and such factors as social pressure for
conformity could put them farther from reality.
The recent focus on conceptual structures may not remove the
problems of factual studies, because the mental models approach
implicitly treats technical facts and concepts as all that are important in
hazard knowledge. 30 The method's value also depends upon the
accuracy and completeness of the expert conceptual structure ("influence
25 Steve Woolgar, Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science, 11 S cx.
STUDIES OF SCI. 365 (1981); Michael Mulkay, Looking Backward, 14 sci., TECH. &
HuM. VALUES 441 (1989).
26 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
27 Steve Woolgar, The Turn to Technology in Social Studies of Science, 16 ScI.,
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 20 (1991).
28 Harry J. Otway & Kerry Thomas, Reflections on Risk Perception and Policy, 2
RISK ANAL. 69 (1982).
29 See, e.g., Silvio 0. Funtowicz & Jerome R. Ravetz, Three Types of Risk
Assessment: A Methodological Analysis, in CHRIS WHIPPLE & VINCENT T. COVELLO,
RISK ANALYSIS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 217 (1985); and Steve Rayner, Risk and
Relativism in Science for Policy, in B RANDEN B. JOHNSON & VINCENT T. COVELLO,
THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OFRISK: ESSAYS IN THE SELECTION AND
PERCEPTION OF RISK 5 (1987).
30 Branden B. Johnson, The "Mental Model" Meets the "Planning Process":
Wrestling with Risk Communication Research and Practice, 13 RISK ANAL. 5 (1993).
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diagram"). An influence diagram on floods omitted the critical effect of
urbanization on runoff volume, a concept whose presence in urban
residents' mental models of flood this study thus could not test.3 1 More
work must be done to define which concepts, expert or not, embody
knowledge before a conceptual approach resolves the problems posed
by fact-centered research methods.
Indirect Knowledge versus Experience
The literature distinguishes poorly between knowledge gained from
personal experience and that from others' experience (e.g., through
social networks, mass media or books). Experts and laypeople alike
draw on both sources to make decisions; yet almost no hazards
researchers have studied their effects on the same issue. Technological
hazards researchers emphasize indirect knowledge, such as whether
people know what fuel is used by most nuclear fission power plants.
Natural hazards researchers emphasize experience; they attend to indirect
knowledge primarily in terms of the impact of deliberate media
campaigns to educate people about natural hazards. The fact that they
find trivial impacts, 32 while mass media research on technological
hazards (see "Dissemination" discussion below) often finds large media
effects on public risk agendas, suggests the potential value of more
inclusive research.
This division of labor is not entirely unjustified. Most people do not
experience nuclear accidents, even those living next to a nuclear power
plant. It is not even certain that people near Three Mile Island in 1979
experienced an accident, rather than a muddled evacuation and media
coverage. It was labeled an accident (sometimes an inevitable one) by*
many people, both local residents and experts. Yet, varied responses to
seemingly alike hazard events 33 and the idea that such responses can
amplify or reduce both actual and perceived risk34 suggest area residents
31 Lave & Lave, supra note 13.
32 Thomas F. Saarinen, The Relation of Hazard Awareness to Adoption of
Mitigation Measures, in PERSPECTIVES ON INCREASING HAZARD AWARENESS I
(Saarinen ed. 1982).
33 EDWARD W. LAWLESS, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIALSHOCK (1977).
34 Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual
Framework, 8 RISKANAL. 177 (1988).
4 RISK - Issues in Health & Safety 189 [Summer 1993]
did not experience a simple accident. Natural hazards researchers have
tended to focus on actual harms suffered, as opposed to the possible
harms often the focus of technological hazards research. For such harms
direct experience of flood surge or earthquake tremors seems more
salient to researchers than prior messages from indirect sources about
these dangers.
Ultimately, however, this division of focus between natural and
technological hazards research is inadequate. It leaves out technological
hazards with which people have much experience, such as automobiles,
and how some people use indirect knowledge of natural hazards to
avoid or prepare for tsunamis, floods, and the like. Academic contrasts
between natural and technological hazards are premature. 35 To fully
understand how people deal with hazards in the light of their
knowledge, one must look at the role of both indirect and personal
experience. For example, British sheepfarmers' grasp of the uncertainty
inherent in their work, and doubt about previous official statements on
radiation from a local reprocessing plant, led them to reject official
overconfidence about the local effects of Chemobyl. Scientific data later
supported the farmers' caution.36 The interplay of indirect and direct
knowledge becomes even more vital as research goes beyond experience
with risky consequences (e.g., "I've been in a terrible automobile
accident.") to experience with risk managers (e.g., "Has this agency
credibly managed past problems that affected me or might have?"). 37
Scholars have just begun to study what lay experiences (if any) with
hazard managers affect perceived risk and trust in managers, much less
use these experiences as measures of knowledge.38
Indirect knowledge and experience also differ in emotional power.
Experience gives immediate sensory feedback, as in snowfall or the
odors that often led New Jersey citizens to seek data on chemical
35 George Cvetkovich & Timothy C. Earle, Classifying Hazardous Events, 5 J.
ENV. PSYCH. 5 (1985).
36 Wynne, supra note 11.
37 Roger E. Kasperson, Six Propositions on Public Participation and Their
Relevance for Risk Communication, 6 RISKANAL. 275 (1986).
38 Branden B. Johnson, Trust in Theory: Many Questions, Few Answers (Soc'y
Risk Anal. 1992).
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emissions.39 This contrast between knowledge and experience may
imply different kinds of information processing, depending on its
source or modality. As with the taste of a madeleine for Proust's
narrator, the presence or absence of odor and other sensory signals may
alter available memories, salient criteria, and apparent danger. Yet, the
role of experience seems to vary widely. Sometimes visible signs
provoke fear, as when people see factory steam as dangerous pollution
or a tornado on the horizon as a sign of imminent danger. Sometimes
they reassure, as when factory smoke symbolizes jobs.4 0 The
invisibility of radiation's link to cancer allegedly drives concern, 4 1 yet
inability to see or taste toxic chemicals in drinking water seems
sometimes to offer comfort.42 Some scholars even argue that no alleged
attribute of a hazard cause - whether an actual flood or the "dread" of
nuclear power - can dependably determine hazard views.43 Even if
this minority belief goes too far, it show the fallacy in taking experience,
or any other aspect of knowledge, as obvious or unambiguous.
Experience may fortify cognitive biases, such as overconfidence in
one's risk estimates.44 Survivors of natural disasters often downplay
future risks: their survival confirms they can handle anything, while
their non-probabilistic view of the world means "lightning never strikes
39 BRANDEN B. JOHNSON, AN UNDERUSED RESOURCE: USERS' EXPERIENCES WITH
AND EXPECTATIONS OF NEW JERSEY COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW DATA (NJ
DEPE-DSR 1991).
40 CHARLES 0. JONES, CLEAN AIR (1975).
41 P.D. PAHNER, A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECrIVE OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY
CONTROVERSY (RM-76-67, Int'l Instit. Applied Systems Analysis, 1976); R.L.
DuPont, Nuclear Phobia: Phobic Thinking About Nuclear Power, in EDISON
ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR POWER IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 23 (1980).
42 Janet M. Fitchen, Jenifer S. Heath & June Fessenden-Raden, Risk Perception in
Community Context, in THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK:
ESSAYS ON RISK SELECTION AND PERCEPTION 31 (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T.
Covello eds. 1987).
43 Otway & Thomas, supra note 28; Steve Rayner, Muddling Through Metaphors
to Maturity: A Commentary on Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk, 8
RISK ANAL. 201 (1988); MICHIEL SCHWARZ & MICHAEL THOMPSON, DIVIDED WE
STAND: REDEFINING POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHOICE (1990). See also,
Woolgar, supra note 27.
44 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health
Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441 (1982).
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twice in the same spot." Together these beliefs can lessen risk
prevention and reduction, as laypeople and some scholars ignore the
problem of how to measure exposure to a hazard event consistently. The
latter sometimes use sampling techniques that confuse people who
suffered hurricane-strength winds with those exposed to strong but
weaker winds further from a storm's center. This sampling error results
in failure to know whether people who "survived Hurricane Andrew"
indeed had identical experiences. Whether indirect knowledge has
identical effects on cognitive biases will remain unknown until
researchers compare these two kinds of knowledge.
"Risk Perception"
Use of the term "risk perception" hampers progress. First, the term
implies that lay views differ from what experts believe (and thus the
way things really are). Second, it does not specify the changes in
values, beliefs, attitudes or behavior that might result from a fact's
presence or absence, or proper or improper use of a concept. For
example, in one city experts and residents worried about possible health
effects of pervasive chromate (hexavalent chromium) waste. Some
experts fretted over a rumor that there were residents who believed
chromium to be the name of a disease. Yet, such a misunderstanding is
insignificant unless it prevents citizens from taking truly protective
action, or from fully weighing their personal risk. Without clearly
specifying what scholars and others mean by risk perception, however,
one cannot properly evaluate such hypotheses about factual significance.
It would be better to distinguish among several different dependent
variables that one might consider when referring to risk "perception." 45
First, there is issue attention: What makes a topic worthy of further
study and, perhaps, concern? Knowledge is a common implicit answer.
Yet, having one's house flooded every spring for ten years is but one
knowledge underlying issue attention. Quite different knowledges create
social or religious norms to trust or beware certain issues, institutions or
behavior, and thus to pay special attention to potential sources of threat
or benefit.46
45 Branden B. Johnson, Risk and Culture Research: Some Cautions, 22 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCH 141 (1991).
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Many risk analysts presume that estimates of risk probabilities (i.e.,
knowledge) drive evaluation of a hazard's seriousness or worthiness of
further action. Yet, lay risk estimates include not only a hazard event's
likelihood or even its outcome, but other items less often seen as
knowledge (e.g., dread, familiarity).4 7 In addition, hazard evaluation
stems only partly from valid risk estimates or the uncertainties in risk
assessment.4 8 Thus Norwegian students saw "unknown" hazards as
insignificant, while Americans took the opposite view.49
Ideologies, the opinions of people within job or neighborhood
networks, and other factors also affect a hazard's salience. For example,
in a California referendum on nuclear power, those informed about
nuclear power voted on the basis of ideology. The less knowledgeable
voted for the position held by their most important reference group.5 0
Knowledge as usually defined in hazards research may even be trivial in
evaluation. The chance to be "for" one's country or "good science," or
"against" drugs, abortion or government interference with private
property may carry more weight than do risk estimates.
Attribution of cause and responsibility (e.g., praise or blame) for
hazard entails other knowledges. Pertinent "facts" might include the
identities of potentially responsible parties, those most likely to be
responsible given the available facts, and those who should have known
and prevented the threat but refused to do so despite clear obligations to
act. Yet, knowledge may not be the strongest factor in attribution. For
example, ideology can help one allocate responsibility whether one has,
or even seeks, information about who can choose to prevent or advance
a given outcome.5 1 Even when knowledge has an effect, it may not be
46 Rayner, supra note 43.
47 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in S OCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE Is S AFE
ENOUGH? 181 (Richard C. Schwing & W.A. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980).
48 Freudenburg, supra note 11.
49 Karl H. Teigen, Wibecke Brun & Paul Slovic, Societal Risks as Seen by a
Norwegian Public, 1 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 111 (1988).
50 Kuklinski et al., supra note 1.
51 Steve Rayner & Robin Cantor, How Fair Is Safe Enough? 7 RISK ANAL. 3
(1987).
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the one expected by experts. Poor and working-class citizens who
gained knowledge as they became environmental activists also gained
fear and anger at government betrayal. 52
Knowledge of feasible actions partly affects the strategy one uses to
get hazard controls enacted (e.g., vote, lobby government, violence).
But feasibility depends upon more than knowledge of costs, benefits,
and available resources. One also takes into account capacity to affect
others' behavior, ability to justify the strategy as proper (e.g., moral),
tradition, desire to avoid or foment conflict, compliance or resistance to
orders, and seizure of unexpected openings. These knowledges do not
fit easily into current approaches. One reason for that may be that much
interest in knowledge's role in risk "perception" concerns action rather
than thought. Many hazard managers, for example, want people to stop
becoming activists and being rude at public meetings. To a great extent,
their public relations pain comes from ignoring the frequent influence of
non-knowledge factors in strategic behavior, including their own.
The same applies to preferences for certain hazard controls over
others. Knowledge about technical suitability is important, but political,
cultural, and moral issues are critical as well (e.g., many
environmentalists resist use of nuclear power to avoid global warming,
or auctions to reduce air pollution). Economic resources also limit
people's ability to act upon credible advice; institutions that justify
limited environmental sampling or chemical tests by lack of money53
often fail to recognize this constraint on others. Radon remediation may
be (or seem) too costly, for example, or people interested in an
informational briefing may not attend for lack of child care. Apathy or
uncritical trust are reasonable for people who lack resources or a sense
of control. Residents of a wealthy town, by contrast, may prefer more
costly hazard controls than those advised by experts (e.g., to lower
radiation in ground water)54 if they apparently avoid more risk that way.
52 HAL ARONSON, BECOMING AN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST: THE PROCESS OF
TRANSFORMATION FROM EVERYDAY LIFE INTO MAKING HISTORY IN THE HAZARDOUS
WASTE MOVEMENT (Am. Sociol. Assn., 1992).
53 David Ozonoff & Leslie I. Boden, Truth and Consequences: Health Agency
Responses to Environmental Health Problems, 12 S CI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUEs 70
(1987).
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Thus, the ways that we create, discover and respond to hazards are
far more varied than "risk perception" implies. Although scholars may
retain that term, they must specify the attitudes and behavior they study
if knowledge research results are to be comparable across studies.
Aspects of Hazard Knowledge Use
The research on hazard knowledge discussed earlier takes facts and
concepts as things people either know or don't know, ignoring dynamic
aspects of knowledge use. People produce and disseminate, as well as
process, information; in all three cases knowledge's definition and
interpretation can vary greatly, shifting its effects on hazard recognition.
Production
Knowledge acquires meaning only in specific social contexts. One
important contextual attribute is the purpose for which one makes new
knowledge. Is it to estimate the risk of a technology or natural event?
select the best hazard control? decide which hazard to study, or whether
to manage hazards rather than tackle another part of life? Each purpose
alters the questions one asks and the answers one (sometimes) hopes
for, and thus changes the likely answers. For example, knowledge
made by and for professional hazard managers frames the facts
differently than when they appear in the everyday world. In that world
most people (including off-duty risk professionals) cope with possible
hazards simply as aspects of life, rather than as "risks."' 55 Purposes also
vary across stages of knowledge development, thus changing cognitive
and technical bases. For example, in the academic world alone casual
queries, formal research applying established theory to a new area, and
exploratory research aimed at theory development diverge on hoped-for
answers, salient data, and necessary analytical techniques, among other
attributes. These contrasts change the knowledge produced.
Knowledge also varies by its producer. Government, industry,
environmentalists and professors have varied aims, e.g., risk estimates
54 Frank Langfitt, In One Township, Radium Issue Runs Deep, Philadelphia
Inquirer, July 30, 1989, at B1, B6.
55 Otway & Thomas, supra note 28; Harry Otway & Brian Wynne, Risk
Communication: Paradigm and Paradox, 9 RISK ANAL. 141 (1989).
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may be for internal use, or to publicly defend or oppose regulation. A
near-bankrupt firm may estimate lower risks than does a corporation that
can afford new regulations that might hurt its weaker competitors if it
can get its estimates enacted in agency standards. With multiple
producers comes potential conflict, further shaping knowledge. Taken-
for-granted facts do not have the same epistemological or political status
as challenged premises, even for their proponents. 56
How laypeople produce knowledge is unknown, because scholars
have assumed citizens' knowledge depends only on their receipt and
understanding of expert knowledge. Yet, if experience is truly
knowledge, laypeople produce hazard knowledge that is not simply a
distortion of science. Anecdotal data also suggest that citizens use
analogies to help decide whether and who to trust, or to make other
hazard-related judgments, on issues such as radioactive waste.5 7 It is
unknown whether such lay-produced knowledge interferes with or
complements understanding and acceptance of expert knowledge; such
effects probably vary across topics and knowledge producers.
Sheepfarmers' experiences led them to doubt (in retrospect, aptly)
official statements on local effects of Chernobyl. At least once "mere"
housewives identified local health effects of a chemical and got EPA
agreement (after much resistance) to severely restrict use.58 Citizens
have often championed alternatives to manage local solid and hazardous
waste problems. If the technical and economic wisdom of some of these
is suspect, lay efforts to produce (or exploit) knowledge other than that
of institutions is not. Such knowledge is not necessarily superior to that
of experts, but its effects on hazard response and political debate cannot
be ignored if understanding of hazards knowledge is to improve.
56 LIORA SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN THE MAKING
OF STANDARDS (Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer, 1988); Paul Slovic, Nancy Kraus &
Vincent T. Covello, Comment: What Should We Know About Making Risk
Comparisons? 10 RISKANAL. 389 (1990).
57 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. KRAFT, BRUCE B. CLARY & JAMES SCHAEFER, POLITICS,
PLANNING AND TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS: STATE AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT 3 (Am. Polit. Sci. Assn., 1987); RICHARD W.
STOFFLE ET AL., SOCIAL ASSESSMENT OF SITING A LOW-LEVELRADIOACrVE WASTE
STORAGE FACILITY IN MICHIGAN (1990).
58 Jeffrey Smith, EPA Halts Most Use of Herbicide 2,4,5-T, 203 SCIENCE 1090
(1979).
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Dissemination
How people convey knowledge to others also shapes knowledge
content. This is partly recognized by experts who blame the mass media
for lay ignorance: if only reporters weren't so ignorant of science,
quoted the right sources, and didn't sensationalize, the public would be
much wiser about hazards. There is some truth to this assertion, yet it
obscures as much as it reveals. The media do not cover types and
attributes of hazards as many experts would, but the gap is smaller than
assumed.59 Media reports may overstate or misconstrue the basis of
conflict over hazards, but rarely produce conflict. 6 0 Even with
"balanced" coverage the very number of hazard stories might raise
concerns, although the evidence for this hypothesis is mixed.6 1 What
sources say, correctly quoted, can affect perceived risk as much as who
is quoted,62 and agencies, firms, and others actively seek to get their
messages out.63 Thus sources help create media "distortions." Media
select sources partly to display conflict, yet "extreme" sources (e.g.,
industry vs. environmentalists) are rare compared to government
officials or even the "person in the street." Extreme views tend to be
filtered out.64 Coverage can affect both the public's and policy elites'
59 Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56
JOURN. Q. 837 (1979); SCIENTISTS AND JOURNALISTS: REPORTING SCIENCE AS NEWS
(Sharon M. Friedman, Sharon Dunwoody & Carol L. Rogers eds. 1986); PETER W.
SANDMAN,DAVID B. SACHSMAN & MICHAEL R. GREENBERG, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS SOURCE: INFORMING THE MEDIA DURING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1987);
Allan Mazur, Nuclear Power, Chemical Hazards, and the Quantity of Reporting, 1990
MINERVA 294.
60 Roger E. Kasperson et al., Social Amplification of Risk: The Media and Public
Response, in WASTE MANAGEMENT '89: WASTE PROCESSING, TRANSPORTATION,
STORAGE AND DISPOSAL, TECHNICAL PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1 HIGH-
LEVEL WASTE AND GENERAL INTEREST 131 (R.G. Post ed. 1989).
61 Allan Mazur, Media Coverage and Public Opinion on Scientific Controversies, 31
J. COMMUN. 106 (1981); David L. Protess et al., The Impact of Investigative
Reporting on Public Opinion and Policymaking: Targeting Toxic Waste, 51 PUB.
OPINION Q. 166 (1987); Kasperson et al., supra note 60; Mazur, supra note 59.
62 MEDIA INSTITUTE, CHEMICAL RISKS: FEARS, FACTS, AND THE MEDIA (1985);
Friedman et al., supra note 59; Sandman et al., supra note 59.
63 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., BEYOND AGENDASETING: INFORMATION SUBSIDIES AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
64 Media Institute, supra note 62; Sandman et al., supra note 59.
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hazard views, so that media agendas do not affect merely (or even
mostly) an allegedly vulnerable lay public. Media effects vary by
whether one measures what people think of a hazard or what hazards
they think about, identifies effects with a survey or experiment, 65 and
controls for other knowledge or traits of media users, e.g., hazard
experience. 66 No universally valid statement about media effects on
public hazard agendas exists. What people seek from media - facts or
amusement - and their frameworks, e.g., ideology, for media data also
affect what they attend to, understand and accept.67
The focus on mass media ignores another, potentially potent
distributor of hazard information: social networks. Those we talk to,
and about what, have effects far beyond a simple delivery (or distortion,
as in rumor) of data. Discussions with family, friends, neighbors and
co-workers reinforce or offset mass media effects. Discussions help
people decide what raw or pre-digested data mean,68 although they may
not foster more reflection than solitary analysis. Hazards and human
responses also may create or destroy social networks, as at Love Canal,
65 PHILLIP J. TICHENOR, GEORGE A. DONOHUE & CLARICE N. OLIEN, COMMUNITY
CONFLICT AND THE PRESS (1980); MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & STEVEN L. COOMBS,
MORETAN NEWS: MEDIA POWER IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1981); SHANTO IYENGAR &
DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION
(1987); DAVID P. FAN, P REDICTIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION FROM THE MASS MEDIA:
COMPUTER CONTENT ANALYSIS AND MATHEMATICALMODELNG (1988).
66 MEDIA POWER IN POLITICS (Doris A. Graber ed. 1984); Dorothy Nelkin
(Background Paper), in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE
COMMUNICATION OF SCIENTIFIC RISK, SCIENCE IN THE STREETS, 21 (1984); MICHAEL
MACKUEN, ROBERT ERIKSON & JAMES A. STIMSON, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
ECONOMIC EXPERrENCE AND ExPECTATIONS FOR POLmCALEVALUATIONS (Am. Polit.
Sci. Assn., 1988).
67 THE USES OF MASS COMMUNICATION: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON GRATi-
FICATIONS RESEARCH (Jay G. Blumler & Elihu Katz eds. 1974); DENNIS HOWrrr,
MASS MEDIA AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1982); MEDIA GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH:
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES (Karl Erik Rosengren, Lawrence A. Wenner & Philip
Palmgreen eds. 1985); Harold I. Sharlin, Macro-Risks, Micro-Risks, and the Media:
The EDB Case, in THE SOCIALAND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK: ESSAYS IN
THE SELECTION AND PERCEPTION OF RISK, 183 (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T.
Covello eds. 1987).
68 Tom R. Tyler, Assessing the Risk of Crime Victimization: The Interaction of
Personal Victimization Experience and Socially Transmitted Information, 40 J. S OC.
ISSUES 27 (1984); Susan J. Smith, News and the Dissemination of Fear, in
GEOGRAPHY, THE MEDIA, AND POPULAR CULTURE, 229 (Jacquelin Burgess & John R.
Gold eds. 1986).
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altering the information that members seek, receive and produce.6 9
Social networks include people one wants to protect (e.g., children),
affecting one's concerns, questions and reasons for seeking,
understanding and accepting answers.7 0 In short, dissemination
channels do not simply convey information with varying precision and
accuracy; whether mass media or personal, they actively affect what
counts as knowledge for various audiences.
Information Processing
This aspect of hazard knowledge has received much attention
through pioneering work on heuristics as discussed above. Yet, many
scholars and practitioners mistake the implications of these results,
beyond wrongly assuming experts' immunity to cognitive biases (see
"Studies of Knowledge," above). Most data on heuristics come from
experiments whose design may make heuristics misleading; heuristics
may be more useful in the real world except for rare, perhaps not yet
experienced, disasters.7 1 Experiments also exclude factors that might
offset or worsen distortion due to heuristics. These include being
accountable to others for one's risk estimate,72 social norms,73 talk with
others before estimating risks74 and assumptions that problems are
69 Martha R. Fowlkes & Patricia Y. Miller, Chemicals and Community at Love
Cana in THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK: ESSAYS IN THE
SELECrION AND PERCEPTION OFRIsK, 55 (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello,
eds. 1987).
70 Howitt, supra note 67; Lawrence C. Hamilton, Concern About Toxic Wastes:
Three Demographic Predictors, 28 S OC. PERSP. 463 (1985).
71 Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Hypothesis Evaluation From a
Bayesian Perspective, 90 PSYCH. REV. 239 (1983); Lola L. Lopes, Some Thoughts
on the Psychological Concept of Risk, 9 J. EXP. PSYCH.: HUM. PERC. & PERF. 137
(1983); Lawrence D. Phillips, A Theoretical Perspective on Heuristics and Biases in
Probabilistic Thinking, in ANALYSING AND AIDING DECISION PROCESSES, 525
(Patrick Humphreys, Ola Svenson & Anna Vari eds. 1983); ALVIN I. GOODMAN,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986); CARL GUSTAF HoYos, ATrrrUDE TO AND
ACCEPTANCE OF UNCERTAIN SITUATIONS: THE VIEWPOINT Op PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIETY
AND UNCERTAINTY, 49 (1987); Freudenburg, supra note 11; Smithson, supra note
16.
72 Peter J.D. Carnevale, Accountability of Group Representatives and Intergroup
Relations, in EDWARDJ. LAWLER, ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES, 227 (1985).
73 George Wright, Organizational, Group, and Individual Decision Making in
Cross-Cultural Perspective, in WRIGHT, B EHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING, 149 (1985);
S.H. IRVING & J.W. BERRY, HUMAN ABILITIES IN CULTURAL CoNTExT (1988).
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serious only if regulated by government.75
Other influences on information processing have received far less
attention than heuristics. For example, laypeople who are risk-averse 76
either distort or do not process information. Yet, experts' concern about
risk aversion ignores variation across people, times and situations, and
in its effects on use of knowledge. Thus, people unable to cope with a
threat do not deny risk if they still hope to gain control; instead, they
seek information relating to such control.77 They may become "popular
epidemiologists" to get data government does not (and perhaps cannot)
provide, thus avoiding risk by seeking information.7 8 Often researchers
see only how risk aversion affects others' definitions and processing of
knowledge, not how it affects their own work.
Sometimes information processing, as psychologists use the term,
does not occur. Actions can happen without much thought, justified
later (knowingly or otherwise) with reasons other than the real reasons.
Hazards scholars err if they take these statements at face value. It is
more prudent to treat them as verbal behaviors whose relation to
remedial or other actions must be examined, not merely assumed.
Another slighted aspect of processing is people's focus on helpful
information, an obvious focus often overlooked by alleged hazard
educators. Officials offering whole-body radioactivity scans and
refusing water analyses to British farmers after Chernobyl did not
understand the farmers' anger. Yet, the latter felt they could do nothing
with the first kind of information, while water supplies could be
74 MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1985); John Ziman, Public Understanding of Science, 16 ScI., TECH. & HUM.*
VALUES 99 (1991).
75 DOMINIC GOLDING, SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONZO PLOUGH, RADON RISK
COMMUNICATION IN CONTEXT: ANEXPERIMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS (Report to EPA)
(1990).
76 NEIL D. WEINSTEIN, ATTITUDES OF THE PUBLIC AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS (Final Report of
Study 2 in Public Perceptions of Environmental Hazards, NJ DEP 1988); Kraus et al.,
supra note 12.
77 Pieter-Jan M. Stallen & Arend Tomas, Public Concern About Industrial Hazards,
8 RISK ANAL. 237 (1988).
78 Phil Brown, Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to Toxic Waste-
Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts, 12 ScI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 78
(1987).
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changed if there was a problem.79
Finally, researchers and hazard professionals who doubt laypeople's
ability to process technical knowledge overlook:80
... the enormous amount of sheer effort needed for
members of the public to monitor sources of scientific
information, judge between them, keep up with shifting
scientific understandings, distinguish consensus from
isolated scientific opinion, and decide how expert knowledge
needs qualifying for use in their particular situation. They
must also judge what level of knowledge is good enough
for them. This is not necessarily the same level as scientists
have assumed; the threshold may be looser, or tighter.
However limited the understanding of life's dangers reached by this
process, researchers too often fail to recognize the achievements of
laypeople who take on this task.
Conclusions
Ultimately knowledge is meaningful information. Meaning is not
inherent in information; it requires interpretation to turn mere data into
something that can be analyzed and acted upon. Research on the role of
hazard knowledge in thought and action has tended to abstract from the
daily contexts in which knowledge becomes real for people, whether
laypersons or experts. Such abstraction has undermined the confidence
with which analysts can treat these findings. This paper has stressed
factors that undercut the effects of knowledge on hazard responses, but
one must treat even these hypotheses with caution given the poor
definitions and taxonomies of hazard knowledge now available.
Some may take the case for both greater clarity and a broader
definition of hazards knowledge, and criticism of factual and technical
emphases, as advocating relativism. That is false, and failure to follow
this agenda may actually foster relativism. Risk assessment and hazard
management have flaws, even discounting some popular criticisms
driven more by ideology than by logic. As such flaws become more
obvious, society faces a potentially sterile choice. It either wholly rejects
79 Wynne, supra note 23 at 117.
80 Id., original emphasis.
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expertise, i.e., "anything goes" in weighing hazard claims, or adheres
rigidly to scientific dogmas of a select few. A more creative and flexible
approach to knowledge may provide a fruitful third way.
The hazards field needs more advanced study of the role of
knowledge. Useful theories (some covered here) appear in other fields,
and the mental models method is flexible enough to include non-
technical types of knowledge. Measuring different knowledges held by
different people will not be easy. Researchers will have to recognize
when people know more than they can say,8 1 or grasp the "practical
logic" behind new technologies far better than they can answer "direct
questions about the nature of scientific inquiry." 82 Further study of the
varied nature of ignorance (Figure 1) also would help.
People's relative knowledge (both within and between lay and
expert populations) may indeed predict the issues they attend to or
worry about, and what they decide to (or actually) do about these
issues. Testing that possibility more definitively, whether for laypeople
or experts, requires that hazards scholars first admit the depth and nature
of their ignorance about knowledge. Only then may we truly begin to
learn the degree to which knowledge affects hazard attitudes and
behaviors.
81 MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHIL-
OSOPHY (1962).
82 Ziman, supra note 74.
